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Abstract
Recent years have seen a number of cyber attacks tar-
geting Industrial Control Systems (ICSs). Reports detail-
ing the findings from such attacks vary in detail. Hands-
on experimental research is, therefore, required to bet-
ter understand and explore security challenges in ICSs.
However, real-world production systems are often off-
limits due to the potential impact such research could
have on operational processes and, in turn, safety. On the
other hand, software-based simulations cannot always
reflect all the potential device/system states due to over-
simplified assumptions when modelling the hardware in
question. As a result, laboratory-based ICS testbeds have
become a key tool for research on ICS security. Devel-
opment of such a testbed is a costly, labour- and time-
intensive activity that must balance a range of design
considerations, e.g., diversity of hardware and software
platforms against scalability and complexity. Yet there is
little coverage in existing literature on such design con-
siderations, their implications and how to avoid typical
pitfalls. Each group of researchers embarks on this jour-
ney from scratch, learning through a painful process of
trial and error. In this paper we address this gap by re-
flecting on over 3 years of experience of building an ex-
tensive ICS testbed with a range of devices (e.g., PLCs,
HMIs, RTUs) and software. We discuss the architecture
of our testbed and reflect on our experience of addressing
issues of diversity, scalability and complexity and design
choices to manage trade-offs amongst these properties.
1 Introduction
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) play an important
role in the monitoring, control, and automation of crit-
ical infrastructure such as water, gas, oil, and electric-
ity [1]. First generation (monolithic) and second gen-
eration (distributed) ICSs typically used proprietary and
closed- source components and standards, with limited
connectivity to non-ICS systems. In contrast, contem-
porary third generation (networked) ICSs frequently use
open technologies, while connecting to and communicat-
ing over other (potentially non-ICS) networks [2]. This
openness has come at the cost of new points of ingress
and attack vectors [3]. This is evidenced by a number of
attacks targeting ICS [4, 5, 6, 7]. The attack surface of fu-
ture generations of ICSs is likely to increase further with
developments such as Industrial Internet of Things [8].
Consequently, there is increasing interest in the secu-
rity research community to study security issues in ICSs
and propose effective countermeasures that have been
rigorously designed and evaluated. However, such re-
search faces two key challenges. Firstly, experimentation
on real-world ICSs is hardly possible due to the inherent
risks and impact of failures arising from replicating an
attack. Secondly, using software simulations has several
disadvantages such as not being able to reflect all the po-
tential system states, unavailable modelling of hardware,
or over-simplified assumptions about the ICS [9]. As a
result, we have seen the development of physical ICS
testbeds, utilising real-world devices and systems within
a laboratory setting [9, 10, 11].
Development of such testbeds is a costly, labour- and
time-intensive activity that must balance a range of de-
sign considerations. For instance, diversity, in terms of
a range of devices and software, is essential to replicate
real-world scenarios—recent industry reports, e.g., [12]
have shown that there are more than a hundred vendors
that provide hardware and communication services to
ICSs hosted in 170 countries. Such diversity comes at
a cost, not only in financial terms but also with regards
to scalability and complexity of the experimental infras-
tructure. Yet there is little coverage in existing literature
of first-hand experience of such design considerations,
their implications and how to avoid typical pitfalls. Each
group of researchers, essentially, embarks on this jour-
ney from scratch – learning through a painful process of
trial and error. We address this gap by reflecting on over
3 years of experience of developing such a testbed.
The novel contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present the testbed design and architecture, in-
cluding how it supports diversity of devices, as a
blueprint for future efforts in this area.
• We distill ten lessons learnt from tackling issues of
diversity, scalability and complexity. This includes
challenges arising from the integration of a diverse
range of devices and design considerations related
to Hardware-in-Loop (HIL), simulation, and virtu-
alisation.
• We evaluate our design choices against ICS testbed
functionality recommended in literature [9, 10, 13]
and contrast our testbed against four other physical
testbeds.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 introduces typical ICS architectures and pro-
vides an overview of the devices, network and software
within our testbed. Section 3 discusses lessons learnt
from our experiences to date. Section 4 evaluates our
design choices against functionality recommended in lit-
erature, comparing our testbed against other similar ef-
forts. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Testbed Architecture
2.1 Typical ICS Architecture
The implementation of ICSs varies from sector to sec-
tor, from the overarching system architectures down to
individual devices and network protocols. To account
for these variations, reference models are often applied
to their descriptions, providing a generic platform and
terminology on which further discussions can begin. Ar-
guably the most widely adopted model is the Purdue En-
terprise Reference Architecture (PERA) [14]. As can be
seen in Fig. 1, an ICS can be separated into six levels
across four zones [14]:
• The Safety Zone includes systems and devices used
to manage the safety functions of an ICS.
• The Manufacturing Zone includes systems and de-
vices used for the monitoring, control and automa-
tion of physical processes within an operational site.
These systems and devices are geographically lo-
cated in close proximity to the physical process.
• The Demilitarised Zone provides a “buffer zone”
where data can be shared between the Manufac-
turing and Enterprise zones. This allows for data
to move beyond the geographical constraints de-
scribed in the Manufacturing Zone.
• The Enterprise Zone provides more conventional
non-ICS specific devices and systems to utilise the
data fed in from the Manufacturing Zone (via the
Demilitarised Zone) to perform supervisory and
planning functions across the entire ICS estate.
Figure 1: Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture [14]
2.2 Architecture of Lancaster’s Testbed
Fig. 2 provides a high-level view of Lancaster’s ICS
testbed based on the PERA reference model. Currently
split across six Manufacturing Zones, an ICS Demili-
tarised Zone, and an Enterprise Zone (with its own sepa-
rate Demilitarised Zone), all equipment in the testbed is
physical (unless otherwise noted as Virtualisation Plat-
form in Fig. 2). It is important to note that, within Lan-
caster’s testbed, we have focused on the development of
systems and devices across Levels 1, 2, 3, DMZ and 4.
We next discuss the testbed in more detail in terms of its
network architecture, the devices and the software.
2.2.1 Network
For each of the core zones, a standard private /24 block
of IP addressing is applied. This decision is based on
discussions with our industry partners, to fulfil exist-
ing requirements, and provide adequate network space
to grow. Unique VLANs are allocated to each of these
address ranges (their use is discussed in more detail in
Section 2.2.3). As all the networking equipment used
is physical, it resides in a data centre, interconnected
with standard cat5. OSPF is used to provide a routing
platform between each zone. There are exceptions to
this, however, as can be seen for External Connectiv-
ity in Figure 2. Our external connectivity includes two
manufacturing zones, one operating over 3G, the other
over 4G or Satellite. In addition it provides an entry
point for researchers external to Lancaster to utilise the
testbed. The 3G, 4G and Satellite communications op-
erate over standard private /24 blocks of IP addressing,
privately routed (no public internet) via our telecommu-
nication provider’s lease-line infrastructure. Currently,
external researchers are provided with a standard private
/28 block of IP addresses, entering via the public internet
with Cisco IPSec software clients. Networking space has
been limited here to reduce the number of clients able to
utilise remote connectivity at any one time.
Underpinning the network infrastructure described
and depicted here is a management network. This op-
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Figure 2: Network Diagram of Security Lancaster’s ICS Testbed
erates over a single private /24 block of IP addressing.
As with all other zones, a unique VLAN is allocated
to this network (see Section 2.2.3 for more details on
its use). Furthermore, all zones route via a designated
switch. This provides a single point by which a VLAN
Trunk can be established, providing network access to
the virtualisation platform, and the testbed room (outside
of the data centre) housing all physical ICS devices.
When considering the segregation and access between
all networked zones, including all external connectivity,
no rule sets are in place by default. This creates what
could be described as a flat network. All firewall capa-
bility is placed in an ANY ANY state, allowing the flow
of all traffic. While this is not how most ICSs will be
configured, for a testbed it provides a starting point with
no restrictions preventing systems and devices from op-
erating. Each experiment can build up rule sets across the
testbed as and when required, reverting back to the ANY
ANY baseline post-completion of experimental work.
2.2.2 Devices
While physical devices can be easily re-configured to
reside in any manufacturing zone, they are all designated
a zone upon initial installation. This designation is de-
rived from interactions with organisations operating ICS,
and how they have designed and added to their infras-
tructures over time. For example, one manufacturing
zone contains Siemens-only devices, another a blend of
Siemens and Allen Bradley devices.
Where legacy devices have been selected, originally
operating over serial based communications, these have
been upgraded to IP. Again, this is a practice representa-
tive of real-world scenarios due to a range of observed
benefits [15]. In addition, it reduces the complexity
of initial configuration/re-configuration and compatibil-
ity within the testbed. However, should research objec-
tives dictate the requirement for non-IP based communi-
cations, it is possible to revert this configuration, making
use of legacy serial based communications.
At the lowest level of the Manufacturing Zone (Level
0) are a series of sensors and actuators. As previously
noted, our focus has not been on the development of
Level 0. Rather than replicate a full operational process
as in [16], we have opted for a more simplistic process,
designed to provide sensory data and controllable func-
tion, with little to no prerequisite knowledge for its con-
figuration/operation. Figure 3 provide a piping and in-
strumentation diagram (PID) of this setup. There are four
instances of this across the testbed. A standard wiring
scheme is applied to all sensors and actuators, and is,
therefore, interchangeable with any controller. To allow
for this interchangeability, we opted for a series of RJ45
connections. To connect or disconnect a controller from
one of the four sets of level 0 equipment takes a few sec-
onds, and does not require devices to be powered down.
2.2.3 Software
Software deployed for the monitoring, control and au-
tomation of ICS is becoming more diverse and com-
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Figure 3: Level 0 PID
plex. To account for this changing landscape we
opted to deploy a VMWare vSphere server. All desk-
top/server based software applications run inside this
vSphere implementation as virtual machines. As noted
above, VLANs are allocated to the various testbed zones,
trunked back into this server. When building a virtual
machine one can select the appropriate VLAN for its im-
plementation (the zone in which it will reside). Thus all
network traffic generated is handled via the physical net-
work implementation without the requirement for vast
numbers of physical desktops/servers. Access to these is
achieved via the previously described Management Net-
work, with every virtual machine assigned a secondary
network interface for use on this network. Inside the
testbed laboratory are five workstations, which reside on
the management network, offering RPD or terminal ac-
cess into each of the virtual machines.
The selection of relevant software – similar to selec-
tion of devices – is derived from interactions with organ-
isations operating ICS, and how they have designed and
added to their infrastructures over time. To provide a
degree of future proofing in the initial stages of develop-
ment we opted for KEPServerEX, providing us with sup-
port for over one hundred and fifty ICS protocols [17],
meaning we are able to communicate with a vast number
of ICS devices from all major vendors.
To account for the requirements posed by IIoT, rather
than provide outbound connections to the public internet,
we currently deploy relevant software packages inside
virtual machines. This can be seen in Fig. 2 with Thing-
Worx and Wonderware inside the Demilitarised Zone.
3 Lessons Learnt
As noted above, an effective ICS testbed must include
a diverse range of devices while providing scalability and
keeping the complexity of the experimental infrastruc-
ture in check – essential requirements for ICS security
research. Furthermore, where researchers may not be in-
tune with the current state-of-the-art of such systems in
a real-world context, it must be integrated as part of the
baseline build. As researchers’ skill sets vary, usability
must also be considered. We next present the lessons
learnt from our first hand experiences in realising diver-
sity, providing scalability and managing complexity.
3.1 Realising Diversity
An effective testbed should be able to mimic a variety
of ICSs setups. We faced several challenges when realis-
ing diversity in our testbed namely, how to select devices
and protocols for inclusion, providing different configu-
rations of devices/manufacturers typical in ICS settings
and balancing device and protocol diversity against other
requirements, such as the implementation of the physi-
cal process itself. Fig. 4 depicts a summarised (i.e. does
not specify quantities/variations) view of the devices and
systems currently implemented in Lancaster’s testbed,
highlighting existing levels of diversity.
Lesson 1: Device and technology selections should be
market-driven. Our initial testbed designs were based
around limited visibility of other facilities, focusing on
one manufacturer’s latest products. This, for example,
limited the number of network protocols we were able to
research and restricted any comparison between legacy
and modern equipment. Over the last three years, we
have worked with a wide range of industry organisa-
tions through research projects, meetings and workshops.
These interactions have provided rich insights into ICS
deployments from legacy, contemporary and future per-
spectives. Furthermore, it is important to reflect indus-
trial practices in a testbed as, otherwise, the research will
most likely be unsuitable for practical applications. Tak-
ing a market-driven perspective has led to our testbed
implementing a wide range of industrial network proto-
cols, these include Modbus/TCP, ISO-TSAP/S7, DNP3,
OPC, EthernetIP and WirelessHART, operating on a va-
riety of hardware and software. Example vendors include
Siemens, Schneider, Westermo, and Allen Bradley. This
allows us to create a range of experimental setups, mim-
icking a variety of typical ICS environments.
Lesson 2: Homogeneity and heterogeneity in field
sites. Manufacturing zones can be homogeneous or het-
erogeneous. Some may deploy devices (PLCs, HMIs,
etc.) from a single vendor while others may utilise and
combine hardware from a range of vendors. Our man-
ufacturing zones are, therefore, configured in a similar
way. For example, Manufacturing Zone 3 is made up of
Siemens-only Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs),
whereas Manufacturing Zone 2 comprises Siemens and
Allen Bradley PLCs. This same discussion relates to
legacy and non-legacy components, with some operators
upgrading all devices simultaneously, and others upgrad-
ing as and when required. This, again, is reflected in our
default Manufacturing Zone configuration. However, to
account for the requirement of variations to the default
setup, all controllers are located in close proximity to one
another, and can be reconfigured in a matter of minutes
to provide an alternative configuration, leaning towards
or away from homogeneity/heterogeneity or legacy/non-
legacy. Without this capability a complete and meaning-
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Figure 4: Overview of Devices and Software in the Security Lancaster ICS Testbed
ful security analysis may not be possible. In contrast, our
original testbed setups were more static, and the ability
to move devices heavily restricted based on their physi-
cal installation.
Lesson 3: Process diversity is not always crucial.
Some testbeds replicate complex physical processes such
as the six stages of purifying raw water, including the
management of chemical dosing such as pH, chlorine,
etc. [16], or the robotic assembly enclave [18]. These im-
plementations reflect closely the processes used in real-
world settings. While highly relevant to ICS security re-
search, they represent a single process and manufactur-
ing zone. Therefore, they cannot, for example, be easily
reconfigured to represent different ICS architectures, use
alternative vendors devices, mix and match legacy/non-
legacy devices, etc. In contrast, we implement a simple
water tank process as shown in Fig. 3. This enables us
to maximise the diversity of devices and configurability
of the testbed – achieved through hot-swap functionality
using standardise wiring schemes – but at the expense of
the ability to model stealthy attacks that exploit physical
aspects of the process [19].
3.2 Providing Scalability
With the procurement of ICS hardware and software
comes significant cost. Balancing cost and scalability
while supporting diversity presents a significant chal-
lenge. For instance, a common method for scaling a
testbed is utilising Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) mathe-
matical representation for simulating the physical plants.
On the other hand, software simulators such as Scilab
and Scicos can be used to add to the number of field
devices, while virtual machines are good for emulating
the number of users/attackers [9]. Here we provide three
lessons learnt around such options for scalability.
Lesson 4: Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) is not essen-
tial in the Manufacturing Zone. There is a lack of exact
mathematical models for representing the behaviours of
sensors and actuators used in monitoring and controlling
the physical devices, or other factors that affect simula-
tion accuracy such as noise [20]. We, therefore, currently
discount HIL as a viable option for scalability. Further-
more, as previously discussed, process diversity is not
crucial, hence our decision to use real devices. The hot-
swap capability allows for a level of scalability with sen-
sors and actuators, moving them between devices as and
when required.
Lesson 5: Simulations in the Manufacturing Zone are
not favoured. The replication of Manufacturing Zone de-
vices is not our first choice. Software does not provide
simulations of many essential types of devices, i.e. from
different vendors or same vendor but distinctive versions,
while the accuracy and reliability of such simulations in
mimicking real-life operations remain an issue. There-
fore, while the cost of physical equipment can be a lim-
iting factor, the benefits it can bring in relation to experi-
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mental rigour is an overriding constraint.
Lesson 6: Virtualisation and VLANs provide ease of
integration and scaling. Deploying server and worksta-
tion instances across physical hardware is time consum-
ing and costly. The use of virtualisation in conjunction
with VLANs has provided us with an easy and cost ef-
fective way to integrate new systems, and scale up ex-
isting instances. The ability to deploy virtual machines
and allocate network connections across all ICS zones,
reduces not only the technical knowledge required when
scaling up experiments, but also provides clean backups
of known good systems should damage be caused during
experimentation.
3.3 Managing Complexity
In search of diversity and scalability, one inevitably
reaches a point where general testbed management be-
comes a challenge in itself. This can be exacerbated
by the goals of the research and the researcher’s expe-
rience. To begin operating and re-configuring various
aspects of the testbed requires some basic knowledge,
for instance, which configuration software packages are
required. Where more complex research goals are pro-
posed, additional devices may be required. For instance,
capturing network traffic centrally across all manufactur-
ing zones would require the configuration and implemen-
tation of additional network components. Here we pro-
vide four lessons learnt from managing this complexity,
based on experience of experimental work utilising the
testbed, examples of which can be seen in [21, 22, 23,
24]. These works also provide insights into the type of
experimentation facilitated by the testbed.
Lesson 7: Employ a Management Network. The com-
plexity of an experimental layer can be reduced by pro-
viding one central point by which connections to all
software based applications and research tools can be
achieved. Giving researchers a single network (called
a Management Network in our case) on which all activ-
ities can be conducted reduces pre-requisite knowledge.
However, it relies on all required research tools being in
place within the existing infrastructure. This is a chal-
lenge we are currently facing and have begun to scale up
with the inclusion of a more diverse set of virtual ma-
chines, including popular security-focused Linux distri-
butions (e.g., Kali and SamuraiSTFU). Furthermore, the
inclusion of appropriate data capture points also needs to
be considered. For example, we lack the capacity to cap-
ture network traffic from every network zone into one
centralised location. This is currently being addressed
through mirrored ports trunked back into the server, with
an appropriate service applied to its collection and anal-
ysis residing within the Management Network.
Lesson 8: Setup Multiple Manufacturing Zones. The
concept of dividing devices up into discrete Manufactur-
ing Zones was never intended as a means to tackle com-
plexity, more to replicate real-world scenarios as previ-
ously discussed. However, it has proven valuable in the
context of concurrent research activities. Discrete sepa-
ration, mixed with the ability to quickly duplicate virtual
machines anywhere in the network, means researchers
can often conduct their activities simultaneously (de-
pendent upon their objectives), without disrupting oth-
ers. The ability to move devices in/out of manufactur-
ing zones can also aid in their management, with non-
relevant devices quickly removed during research.
Lesson 9: Comprehensively document as you build.
Whilst a somewhat obvious lesson, this is nevertheless
critical. Our testbed was built organically and initially
utilised by those designing and implementing it. Hence,
they had comprehensive knowledge of the infrastructure.
However, as the number of users grew – with undergrad-
uate, Master’s as well as external collaborators utilising
the testbed – this presented a major challenge. We had
to go through a laborious and painful process of docu-
menting the system – something which could have been
avoided had we documented systematically as we built.
We not only documented the communication and control
processes within the testbed but also all known vulner-
abilities in the devices and software currently deployed.
This saves new researchers considerable time in under-
standing possible attack vectors, and composing plaus-
able scenarios. However, keeping this documentation up-
to-date is an on-going and substantial effort, one others
building testbeds may want to explicitly budget.
Lesson 10: Optimise data logging for security pur-
poses. Open ICS testbed datasets [25] often record and
offer as many features as they can. Currently the collec-
tion and distribution of data from our testbed is limited as
it involves a manual process requiring time and resource.
One of our previous works [23] discusses the require-
ment for granular data flows and human-device interac-
tion points, as a prerequisite to security control selection
and implementation. Principles derived from this work
were validated when applied in intrusion detection sce-
narios [21], which reduced the number of logged vari-
ables to just 3, yet still achieve high detection accuracy
of 99% for passive attacks. However, such understanding
cannot be obtained automatically in our current testbed
design, something future developments must look to in-
corporate.
4 Evaluating Testbed against Research
Criteria
The previous sections have described Lancaster’s
testbed, along with lessons learnt throughout its evolu-
tion. Here we offer a comparison against four other ex-
isting testbed infrastructures [16, 18, 26, 27]. Note that,
while numerous virtualised ICS testbeds exist, e.g., [28,
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29], we limit our comparison to a subset of similar phys-
ical testbeds reported in literature. We analyse their,
and our own, compliance against a set of recommended
testbed functionalities described in literature [9, 10, 13].
These works recommend ten categories of functionality
for a testbed: (1) Physical device diversity (PD): Sup-
ports a wide range of physical devices; (2) Industrial pro-
tocol diversity (ID): Supports a wide range of industrial
communication protocols; (3) Process diversity (PC):
Supports more than one type of physical operational pro-
cess; (4) Flexibility (FX): Supports multiple configura-
tions; (5) Scalability (SC): Replicates the scale of the
ICSs when needed; (6) Fidelity (FD): Mimics as close
and accurate as possible a real ICS; (7) Simulation Sup-
port (SS): Offers simulations for field devices or process;
(8) Software to support security analysis (SA): e.g., pars-
ing tools for sniffed packets; (9) Optimisation for moni-
toring (OM): Supports optimising data logging to reduce
the impact of security on general operation; (10) Open-
ness (OP): Supports remote access or data openness.
Table 1 presents the results of our analysis. Black
dots represent that a testbed supports a given function
while grey dots represent that it acknowledges the future
need for such a function. Our design decisions driven by
the need to realise diversity while providing scalability
and managing complexity enable our testbed to deliver
on eight out of ten recommended functionalities. We
note, however, that openness is partially supported in
that we provide remote access for other researchers. The
automation of collection and distribution of data from
large-scale experiments is currently limited. Lack of
process diversity and simulation are less of an issue as
these are conscious design choices. Optimisation of data
logging will, therefore, be a major goal for the future.
Table 1: Comparison of functions










This paper discussed the ten most important lessons
learned during the development of the Lancaster testbed
for ICS security research. It can be seen that assuring
diversity and scalability are crucial for reflecting a real-
world ICS closely for a reliable study, while managing
complexity is essential for research efficiency. Through
the brief evaluation, we have demonstrated current ben-
efits and limitations against other testbed implementa-
tions. We note that making the testbed more open for
researchers external to Lancaster University, and there-
fore extending its usability, is of high importance. Activ-
ities including local access and demo capabilities (via a
mobile demo unit), or remote access via VPN, are on-
going, while other targets such as maintaining logged
data for forensic study and offering a platform for global
all-inclusive connectivity will be addressed in our future
work. Finally, we note that the testbed is also being used
for research into the resilience of ICS and utility net-
works, investigating the detection and mitigation of in-
trusions across various layers of the infrastructure.
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